Security, ethnicity, nationalism by Neumann, Iver B.
1 
 
Security, ethnicity, nationalism
1
 
 
Iver B. Neumann  
 
Forthcoming in Nations and Nationalism, 2017 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article, I ask which aspects of ethnicity and nationalism that may be brought into 
sharper focus if we read these two phenomena with a view to how they have been shaped by 
security concerns. The first part of the article clears up some problems inherent in such 
exercises in diachronic concept analysis, and establishes the temporal area of validity for the 
analysis. The second part argues that the very emergence of the concept of ethnos (and its 
Roman translation, gens) was immersed in security thinking. It emerged as a way in which 
Greeks and Romans imposed order on what was outside that was not there before. Ethnic 
groups became ethnic by being interpellated by a stronger polity, and the process was driven 
first and foremost by security concerns. The third part illustrates this with a case study of the 
emergence of Slavic ethnicity. The fourth part of the article discusses how, with the advent of 
nationalism, there is an inversion. If ethnicity was imposed on subaltern groups, then 
European empires attempted to deny nationalism to such groups by insisting that they did not 
have the history to deserve it. Once again, security concerns played a key role, for as rightly 
seen by empires, nationhood could be an important anti-colonial resource. The paper ends by 
noting how nationalism invariably underlines the vitality of the Self, and juxtaposes it with 
the decrepitude of Others. With reference to present-day Russia, I note how the use of such 
organic metaphors in and of themselves securitize the relationship between nations, for the 
implication is that the old should disappear for the new to live, and that highlights security 
concerns on both sides of the relationship. 
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Introduction 
 
Security and nationalism seem to be particularly intertwined in two cases. First, nationalism 
may increase what Ibn Khaldoun referred to as assabiya or action capacity of polities, by 
aligning thinking about identity and hence diminishing transaction costs related to collective 
action. Secondly, in polities which experience problems of legitimacy, for example when 
losing territory or having parts of the population questioning its leadership, the leadership 
often, but not always, responds by trying to fasten the boundaries between us and them by 
playing up nationalism. These two empirical phenomena are, however, so thoroughly 
established in the literature that I see little point in going over them again. In this article, I will 
rather look at the logics that underlie these empirical phenomena, and so I ask: how did these 
possibilities emerge historically? In order to answer this, the article will take the form of a 
conceptual analysis of how security and identity – in the forms of ethnicity and nationalism – 
have related to one another down the centuries. I will begin by discussing how identity, be 
that ethnic and national identities or any other ones, is a relational phenomenon. The relations 
in question will not necessarily be a security concern – I will produce the empirical example 
of the American pre-contact Clovis culture to make this point – but when resources are 
contested, as they almost always are, they will tend to be. I will then discuss how Greeks used 
the term ethnos, and the Romans the term gens, to classify other groups. This classification 
took place in a security context, for Greeks and Romans did not classify themselves as ethnic 
groups. To be an ethnos was by definition to be Other, to be uncivilized. The power of the 
Romans and their classification scheme was so strong that it had a constitutive effect on the 
groups so classified. Put differently, the ethnoi were interpellated into what became their 
ethnic identity. This interpellation happened in a context where Romans attempted to secure 
themselves against the ethnoi. As an example of how this works, I offer the case of the early 
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Slavs. I then go on to highlight how, in direct contrast to ethnos, the term ‘nation’ emerged 
not as an identity for subaltern Others to adopt, but as an identity for the Self, and for the Self 
exclusively. According to the national Self, subaltern Others had no business aspiring to 
national identity. If security concerns spelled the imposing of ethnic identity on barbarians, it 
spelled the denying of national identity to colonials. In conclusion, I highlight how the 
organic metaphors that sustain the concept of nation must also by necessity invoke security 
concerns, for the nation is said to be young, and what is young can only flourish if the old is 
put paid to.  
  
Identity is Relational 
 
Diachronic concept analysis must start with finding a way around a built-in problem. On the 
one hand, the existence of certain phenomena is functionally guaranteed a transhistorical 
reality simply by dint of the human condition. Identity is such a phenomenon, for homo 
sapiens cannot survive without living in groups. Groups have a certain cohesion. The term for 
group cohesion is identity. On the other hand, however, a phenomenon, say identity, is 
defined by its relations to other phenomena. Since the constellation of phenomena constantly 
changes, it is certainly true that only that which has no history can be defined, for history 
throws up a series of related but different phenomena which may mask themselves under the 
same name. Identity was not the same when we were living in hunting and gathering bands as 
when the concept of ethnos began to be applied, and different again when imperative political 
identity began to take the form of nationalism. Identity is a transnational phenomenon, but 
how it manifests socially, varies historically. 
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By the same token, any group needs to protect itself against other groups. The broad concept 
we use for this is security. However, what a group considers a threat and which resources it 
thinks should be set aside in what quantity to meet those threats, varies historically. The built-
in problem is this: how do we generalize about phenomena like identity and security when 
they vary so much historically? 
 
My answer to this challenge is a conventional one. I try to think of phenomena in terms of 
verbs, not nouns; processes, not systems (Goldstein 1999). Phenomena have a narrative 
quality about them; they are practiced and performed. By that token, ethnicity can be 
understood as ‘collective enaction of socially differentiating signs’ (Eriksen 1991: 141), and 
security as the speech act of declaring something as a threat to the group’s ability to go on 
going on as before. Security may be defined as the process of considering using and then 
using large-scale force to deter or eliminate what is seen as a threat to the very fabric of the 
Self (Wæver 1995). The key point, as established by security scholars over the three last 
decades, is that this is a social process. Threats and security are socially produced. We cannot, 
therefore, limit the study of security to ‘the study of the threat, use and control of military 
force’ (Walt 1991: 212), for doing so would mean taking the phenomena we are supposed to 
study for granted, which they are not. On the contrary, they are socially produced by other 
phenomena, such as ethnicity and nationalism.
2
 
 
Security has been an ever-present concern around the globe for the last couple of millennia. 
That, however, does not in and of itself make it a transhistorical phenomenon. It is enough to 
find one point in time and space where the large-scale use of force to deter or eliminate what 
is seen as a threat (our definition of security) is not in evidence for security not to qualify as a 
transhistorical phenomenon. At least one such case exists, and so it is not the case that 
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security as defined here is a necessary aspect of the human condition. The best case of a non-
securitised situation is, I aver, Turtle Island or pre-contact American archaeological human 
cultures from their inception and up to the beginning of the common era (that is, around year 
1 AD). The archaeological name is the Clovis culture. Jonathan Haas (1986: 16) sums it up as 
follows: 
 
Population densities were relatively low, and there was no significant concentration of 
people in specific locales. […] in looking for signs of conflict, violence or warfare in 
this nomadic population, we find that […] there continues to be not a single 
manifestation in the archaeological record. […T]here are no signs of violence in the 
skeletal population in terms of broken heads, scalp marks, parry fractures or projectile 
points embedded in bodies, nor do we find villages or camp-sites being located with 
an eye to defence or the guarding of territory. 
 
The existence of the Clovis culture is important, for it demonstrates that there is no such thing 
as one single state of nature, where everybody feared everybody else, or where everybody ran 
away from everybody else. Security, in the sense of using large-scale force to uphold group 
identity, is not an imperative dictated by nature, or human nature. We may hold (as I, for one, 
do) that an animus dominandi, a drive to dominate others, is an aspect of human nature on the 
individual level, but that does not automatically translate into a collective phenomenon that 
we may call security. Empirically, there are many different 'states of nature', in the sense that 
small groups, let us call them hunter-gatherer bands, have empirically lived side by side in 
many different ways (Donnelly 2012). Some states are marked by high levels of violence, 
some are not. The key thing about the Clovis case is that, in that period, in that place, there 
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was little competition over resources. Grass was plentiful, as was megafauna, human groups 
remained small and fairly egalitarian, and the degree of hierarchy of groups was very low.  
 
As hunting and gathering gave way to more planned ways of managing resources – primarily 
through the advent of agriculture but also by the development of fishing – the size of groups 
grew, as did their degree of hierarchy. The concept of polity captures the nature of the groups 
that now emerged nicely. A polity is a group that has a certain degree of we-ness, a certain 
ability to muster resources and a certain degree of hierarchy (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996), 
with 'a certain degree' of resources and hierarchy meaning more than what it was possible to 
obtain for a hunter-gatherer band. 
 
All this is well known. I mention it simply to build to a point that is not so well known, 
namely that when polities arose, they did not arise alone. In the literature on so-called early 
states, which I think we should rather think of as early polities, it was traditionally stressed 
how emerging polities were pristine. Mesopotamia, the Inka and so on were thought of as 
arising in isolation. This is actually factually incorrect. The emergence of large-scale polities 
everywhere did not take the form of one polity suddenly sprouting out of nowhere. On the 
contrary, the typical sequence was that a number of them emerged together, in competition, 
and this kept on, and I think keeps on, being the case. Think of the cities of Sumer, the 
chiefdoms of Northern Europe, or the states of 16th century Europe. These are what we may 
call peer-group polities (Renfrew and Cherry 1986). This is important to our topic, for it 
means that how to uphold the integrity of the polity in the face of other polities has been a 
challenge from the very first historical emergence of polities, and it keeps on being a problem. 
Security is a systemic imperative of a peer-group polity world. Empirically, periods of 
agglomeration of polities – what we may call empire-building – has alternated with periods 
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where peer-group polities dominated (Watson 1992). At no point, however, have such 
empires been able to root out all other polities. The Roman empire knew of China. The 
Mongol empire knew of other polities, Christendom amongst them. Since the rise of polities, 
the world has been a multi-polity place.  
 
The empirical fact that polities have always risen as peer-group polities anchors an 
understanding of ‘we’ as different from ‘they’. Polities need to order the rest of the world; 
they need a cosmology, and they need a day-to-day way of classifying stuff. The point of 
departure for this ordering is the we. What is outside has to be made sense of in some way or 
the other, and the point of departure for this exercise is how the Self is constituted. It follows 
that we may anchor the importance of identity to security not only empirically, but also 
theoretically. We-ness demands otherness. There is no we that is not limned off from others. 
In post-structural parlance, every identity has a constitutive outside. In the words of Bill 
Connolly (1991: 61), identity needs difference to be, and it tries to secure itself by turning 
difference into Otherness. Once difference is considered as Otherness, the way is short to 
seeing Otherness as a threat. In a peer-polity world where resources are considered scarce, 
then, the fact of group identity is necessarily tied to security. 
 
Scholars have been giving growing attention to what we may call the identity/security nexus 
over the last decades. In a pioneering study, David Campbell (1992) argued at book’s length 
that the history of the US was one of constant othering, which raised the question of whether 
difference stood much of a chance in a post-Cold War world. Campbell wrote this as an 
indictment of the US. He was soon joined by Samuel Huntington (1993), however, who 
happily essentialised and embraced the othering processes in question. Political implication 
aside, this move effectively slams the door in the face of empirical research: if we already 
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know what identities are and how they are distributed, there is no reason why we should 
research these questions.
3
 Ole Wæver (1996) added that it does not follow that otherness need 
to be spatial. To Wæver, the Other may also be a former incarnation of the self. This is a nice 
supplementary insight: the Others that constitute the Self are territorial, but they may also be 
temporal.  
 
The Making of Ethnicity 
 
If the key to understanding the importance of security to identity has to do with how we come 
to see the Other as a threat, where should we look in order to understand this process? We 
must look at how groups produce knowledge of other groups. Since the advent of polities, 
knowledge accompanied power with a view to imposing some degree of order. To take but 
one example, the discipline of geography sprang from the need of generals to know the terrain 
on which they might fight. The geographical term region hails from the Latin verb regere, to 
rule; a region was constituted by its imposed rule (Neumann 1994).  
 
We may draw a line from territory to people here. Any polity consists of three elements: an 
administration, which is the top of the hierarchy; a territory, which may be loosely or broadly 
defined (s loose definition would include things like nomadic treks); and people. From the 
Romans onwards, the Western tradition of knowledge production has classified territory in 
terms of regions. We have also classified people in terms of ethnoi or gentes. To the Greeks 
and later to the Romans, what the Greeks called an ethnos and the Romans called a gens was 
simply a group other than the we, other than ‘us’. Herwig Wolfram’s summary of how this 
worked when Romans wrote sagas about Germanic tribes may be quoted at length in this 
regard for its general purchase: 
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Words such as gens, genus, genealogia and natio, refer to a community of biological 
descent. The tribal sagas, however, equate people with army and thus remain true to 
historical reality. In addition, the sources attest the polyethnic character of the gentes. 
These gentes never comprise all potential members of a gens, but are instead always 
mixed. Therefore their formation is not a matter of common descent but one of 
political decision. Initially this implies not much more than the ability to unite and 
keep together the multitribal groups that make up any barbarian army. The leaders and 
chiefs of ‘well-known’ clans, that is to say, of those families that derive their origins 
from gods and who can prove their divine favor through appropriate achievements, 
form the ‘nuclei of tradition’ around which new tribes take shape. Whoever 
acknowledges the tribal tradition, either by being born into or by being ‘admitted’ to it, 
is part of the gens and as such a member of a community of ‘descent through 
tradition’. The history of a gens is a subject of ethnography, and ethnography, as the 
name implies, deals ‘descriptively with peoples’. By definition these ethnoi or gentes 
do not belong to the observer’s superior culture. They remain outside the civilized 
world (Wolfram 1988: 5-6).   
 
Here we have a key point. Just as the regions postulated by the Romans did not necessarily 
correspond to the way non-Romans living in those regions divided up their territory, so the 
ethnoi of the Greeks and Romans did not necessarily correspond to the way the people so 
classified actually classified themselves. Descriptions in terms of ethnicity are descriptions of 
Others, not of Selves. The ancient Greeks famously defined barbarians as those who did not 
speak Greek; what came out of their mouths was just some bar-bar, that is, blah-blah. This 
tells us that ancient Greeks defined the Self in terms of language, but it also tells us that their 
10 
 
classificatory scheme was not exactly fine-grained. It was, indeed, binary: what was outside 
of the Greek-speaking world remained, in its linguistic aspect, undifferentiated. Such a 
classificatory scheme would most certainly not have been in synch with the classificatory 
schemes of the peoples it classified, who would, by necessity if they wanted to maintain a 
separate we, have to differentiate themselves not only from Greeks, but also from others. This 
could be done in a number of ways, with linguistic differentiation being but one possibility.   
 
Greeks also used hairstyle as a key marker, or diacriticon, of difference. Can we assume that 
language and hairstyle were equally important diacritica to others? Of course we cannot. As a 
matter of fact, we know empirically that they were not. For example, the polities living on the 
Pontic Steppe north of the Greek colonies along the Black Sea coast, did not define 
themselves primarily in terms of language or hair style. Both were certainly identity markers, 
but they were identity markers on a lower level than the polity. The Scythians or the Huns 
were multi-language (and multi-hairstyle) polities, and there is no indication that they had a 
commonly held concept of shared ancestry as a polity.
4
 A colleague and I have recently 
argued elsewhere at book’s length (Neumann and Wigen, forthcoming) that nomads of the 
Eurasian Steppe were certainly interested in common biological beginnings, inasmuch as the 
household was the basic social unit and the household was kinship based. We may stretch the 
point, and say that tribes did uphold we-feeling by socially acknowledging and confirming 
biological kinship, as well as by forging metaphorical kinship (but see Sneath 2007). Nomads 
may also be said to have been interested in collective enacting of socially differentiating 
signs, in the sense that a key identity marker of an adult nomad was the ability to use a bow 
and arrow from horseback. However, and this is the key point, neither of these ‘ethnic’ 
markers pertained to the level of specific steppe polities, for these polities were simply ever-
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changing conglomeration of different tribes. The we-ness of the steppe polity did not hail 
from ancestral identity, but from sworn allegiance to a leader, imposed or otherwise.  
 
A Case: Early Slavs 
 
'Ethnos' and ‘gens’ marked imposed identities. These concepts were at the core of the 
vocabulary Greeks and Roman used to categorise others. ‘We’ are civilization, ‘they’ are 
barbaric ethnoi. Let us take as our example of how security and ethnicity interacts the case of 
a group of people which was close to the steppe in so many ways, namely Slav-speaking 
tribes, and let us use as our guide a magisterial work that draws on archaeological, 
anthropological and historical knowledge to discuss the topic, namely Florin Curta’s 2001 
book The Making of the Slavs. 
 
Curta’s chronotopical point of departure are the sixth-century Danube limes of the East 
Roman/Byzantine empire, which had been recently fortified by emperor Justinian (r. 527-65, 
as a ‘complex interface’ (Curta 2001: 2). This is important, for it means that Curta discounts 
speculations about a Slav Urheimat on the steppe, in the wetlands, in the forest etc. and 
concentrates rather on social interaction as the fount of ethnicity.
5
  Curta’s historiographic 
point of departure is contemporary writers like Procopius and Jordanes.
6
 This is also 
significant, for it means that he discounts the idea that there are references to Slavs in earlier 
sources, like Tacitus. Curta’s theoretical point of departure is new archaeology, where culture 
is seen as participated in, rather than shared (Curta 2001: 29). By necessity, the socio-
psychological aspect of identity will have to be bracked when the data available are 
exclusively or primarily material, as is most often the case in archaeology. By the same token, 
material culture cannot be understood as a property of a group, but as part of its life. What 
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matters for the constitution of a group, then, is what kind of power constellation that invites 
the use of which artefacts (discourse), and how people use artefacts in response to such 
invitations (practice). As Curta puts it programmatically (with reference to Hodder 1982: 187, 
205): ‘the use of material culture in distinguishing between self-conscious ethnic groups leads 
to discontinuities in material culture distributions that may be easily detected by 
archaeological means’ (Curta 2011: 536). 
 
The archaeological record gives no inkling of there having been any Slavic trading posts, 
hilltop forts or towns, but we know from early writers that they did practice itinerant 
agriculture. We also know that their material culture was distinct from material cultures such 
as Przeworsk and Wielbark, which seem to have been largely Germanic-speaking tribes 
(associated with what was to become Vandals and Goths, respectively): 
 
Most of the remains of their [i.e. Slavs’] material culture found in excavations are 
utilitarian, small in quantity and very unprepossessing in character. Unlike the 
majority of earlier populations in this area, they used very few metal ornaments. Most 
of the material of this first phase of Slav culture consists of handmade and bonfire-
fired gritty pottery of a restricted range of forms. This material, when compared with 
the fine fabrics of the pottery of the Przeworsk, Wielbark and Cherniakhovo cultures, 
has an extremely ‘home-made’ look (Barford 2001: 38).  
 
The early Roman writers grouped Slavs with (other) nomads that seem to have been the 
Slavs’ masters, particularly the better-organized Avars, but also the Hunnic group known as 
Cutrugars. The close interaction, and probably multi-lingual character, of these tribes are born 
by the etymological evidence: 
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The early development of the Slav languages in a group made up of elements from 
different backgrounds is betrayed by the existence of loan words from a number of 
languages, including those from Germanic and Iranian. These overlay a substrate of 
elements derived from the Proto-(Balto-) Slavic languages. Indeed it seems very likely 
that the Slav language was one of the main languages spoken as a lingua franca in at 
least part of the communication community that was the Avar khaganate (Barford 
2001: 34).
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The early writers also noted characteristic steppe nomadic ways of waging warfare, such as 
the stratagem of the feigned retreat, as being typically ‘Slavic’ (Curta 2001: 314). They stress 
the tribal and fairly flat nature of political organization – the Sclavenes are said to have 
leaders that were frequently killed during feasts and on travel –that is, not on the battlefield – 
but also mention that the Antes have a king.   
 
Curta (2001: 42) reads this debate about the Slavs amongst Roman writers as a debate about 
how to handle barbarians militarily. The debate is, in other words, not only about identity, but 
also about security. Knowledge production is directly in the service of specific military 
concerns.
8
 The inverse point, that knowledge and identity production is of direct importance 
to security, is one that security studies were late to take on board, but which asserted itself 
with a vengeance once security studies began to branch away from its until then asocial mode 
of analysis towards the end of the Cold War (Neumann and Sending 2017). To mention but 
two landmark studies, in 1990 Richard Ashley and R.J.B. Walker issued a special issue of 
International Studies Quarterly that foregrounded the importance of the social to security (see 
especially Klein 1990, who analysed the identity work that goes into forging and maintaining 
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a military alliance). Similar concerns were prominently on display in the landmark edited 
volume The Culture of National Security (Katzenstein 1996), which succeeded in bringing 
them into the mainstream. Katzenstein noted that students of security had basically slept 
through the end of the Cold War, and ignored domestic political factors such as nationalism. 
He might well have broadened his critique to include the entire academic study of security, 
and also their subject matter, for as we have seen, questions of identity have been imbricated 
with security concerns since the very emergence of polities, and so antedates the coming of 
nations and nationalism.  
 
Going back to our case of such emergence, the Slav ethnos, we should also add that it was a 
typical trait of migrating groups of the time that they were semi-nomadic and that different 
tribes developed different niches. What is beyond doubt is that there existed in the sixth 
century a number of tribes, such as Baiunetes, Belegezites, Berzetes, Drugubites, Sagudates, 
Wends, which predominantly spoke Slavic. In terms of analytical classification, these early 
polities stopped short of being chiefdoms – that is, they were not ‘redistributional societies 
with a permanent central agency of coordination’ (Service 1971: 134) – for economic flows 
seem to have been fairly unregulated by hierarchical structures. Curta (2001: 322-25) 
understands these predominantly Slavic-speaking polities in terms of tribes led by great-men 
(whose authority may be acquired or ascribed but is in any case based on resources other than 
wealth, typically military leadership) and big-men (who establish themselves by beginning to 
accumulate and redistribute economic goods), withy these great-men sometimes joining in 
confederation.
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 The reports that 6
th
-century Slavic tribal leaders were killed during feasts 
make good sense in such as setting, where a number of warriors have a direct interest in the 
great-man not being able to establish himself as a big-men, let alone chief, and would 
therefore have an immediate incentive to nip a burgeoning big-man or chief in the bud.
10
 This  
15 
 
seems to have worked; at least ‘[t]here is no indication of Slavic chiefs before c. 560’ (Curta 
2001: 332).
11
 
 
During the 560s, as the Byzantines were fortifying their limes south of the Danube, reports 
from the limes began to change. Sclavenes were reported to be moving south of the Danube 
and to become more tightly organized politically. Although it became more pressing to know 
details of tribal affiliations given their increased proximity, there are markedly fewer 
references to tribes (Curta 2001: 118). A hundred years later, Slavs were reported to be 
organized into two polities: the Severeis and the Seven Tribes. There had obviously been a 
reorganisation and a consolidation. To Curta, it is exactly this reorganization that is the birth 
of a Slavic ethnos. The Byzantines reached out to an early tribe (the Ante, in 545) by offering 
them a foedus, that is, an alliance where they would fight other barbarians in exchange for 
entering Roman territory and Roman social structures. Such a foedus could only be negotiated 
by a leader, and so the Roman interpellation furthered a change in political organization from 
tribal confederation to a more tight-knit polity, a chiefdom, amongst the Antes, simply in 
order to have someone to talk to (cf. Curta 2001: 332).
12
 Note that there is also a parallel and 
competing security logic afoot, for chiefdoms of the kind formed by the Ante were of course 
much more capable of staging successful raids into the Roman interior than their predecessors 
the loose confederations.
13
 As seen from the point of view of the Byzantines, security needs 
spelt a need for talking to barbarians, which they answered by raising up something the 
specific detachments of barbarians did not have before, namely a great-man and eventually a 
chief to rule an emerging ethnos. However, the emergence of an ethnos lent the detachment of 
barbarians a stronger identity, and hence increased action capacity, which meant that the 
formation of an ethnos was also a security challenge to the Byzantines. Here we have the 
identity/security nexus in full flow. 
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To sum up, language was important as raw material for the emergence of an ethnos, but there 
is no direct fit between language and polity, for the people involved were not exclusively 
Slavic-speaking. Slavic was also used by others, probably even as a lingua franca in and 
around the Avar Kaghanate and, later in Bulgaria. Language was chosen as a criterion by the 
Byzantines, for they thought it was imperative to polity-formation, and, as Butler (1997: 5) 
puts it, only that which is recognisable can be recognised. ‘Slavs did not become Slavs 
because they spoke Slavic, but because they were called so by others’ (Curta 2001: 346). 
Language does not an ethnos make. Note that the Byzantine discourse that interpellated the 
Slavs was a discourse of what we now call security – it is a military-political discourse. The 
interpellation works in a number of ways on the individual level, including the display of 
certain material markers of ethnicity such as a particular type of brooch to fasten cloaks with 
which by dint of such use becomes a ‘Slavic’ bow fibula (Curta 2001: 225, 310) and of ovens 
that were used to bake flat loaves. It also works at the more aggregated level, as ethnicity 
becomes a new resource to forge more complex polities (the Severeis, the Seven Tribes), and 
a means for leaders to maintain loyalty to themselves and their polities.  
 
In light of discussions to come, one last point should be added. Some of the ‘Slavic’ fibulae, 
whose use seems to have been constitutive of Slavic ethnicity, also seems to have indexed a 
heroic past, namely the Hunnic period of Attila (Curta 2001: 434). Some of the people 
wearing them could credibly make this connection since some of their ancestors were 
remembered to have had relations with Huns. The fact that these were subaltern relations was 
not of the essence, the point was that relations existed, so that the wearers could partake in 
and advertise their right to partaking in memories of past glory. This is highly significant, for 
we see here a tentative use of the past to legitimate the newly emergent phenomenon of 
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ethnicity.
14
 What had started as an identity ascribed by an Other – the Byzantines -- is 
embraced and perpetuated by an emergent Self – the Slavs.  
 
Since language is a vehicle of communication, and communication is a necessity for forging a 
polity, language as such must be of importance for identity. In light of language’s subsequent 
centrality in the emergence of nationalism, however, it is also important to note the disconnect 
between ethnicity and any one spoken language. As Curta (2001: 347) sums it up, the ethnic 
groups he has studied ‘were not classified in terms of language or culture, but in terms of their 
military and political potential’. So, language does not an ethnos make, but paired up with 
interpellation from a more complex polity and with certain social practices such as indexing a 
heroic past added, it might.
15
 The American philosopher Saul Kripke has underlined how 
naming is a kind of violence, for it freezes, or even creates, a phenomenon that was until then 
fluid, or even non-existent. In the doling out of the status of ethnos to certain groups, on the 
basis of categories and characteristics that are yours and not theirs, the Byzantines ordered the 
world in their image. The outside world became something it had not been before, namely an 
ethnic place, and non-Byzantine humans became defined by this new thing ethnicity.
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Ethnos to Nation 
 
Curta (2001: 350) ends his path-breaking book with the wry observation that ‘[t]he first clear 
statement that “we are Slavs” comes from the twelfth-century Russian Primary Chronicle. 
With this chronicle, however, the making of the Slavs ends and another story begins: that of 
their “national” use for claims of ancestry’. 
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Curta is certainly correct in arguing that studies of nationalism have pushed back to the 
eleventh and twelfth century in order to find the raw material out of which nineteenth-century 
nations emerged. The debate on these matters seems to congeal around the English and the 
French and how they self-identify in the Middle Ages (Hastings 1997). In these cases, the 
stress is not on how groups are being interpellated by others, but, as Curta notes, on the 
production of narratives about some theme – ancestry, Christendom etc. – within the setting of 
the polity. There are continuities. In the twelfth-century case noted by Curta, Slavic-speaking 
monks write about Slavs and the beginnings of Rus’. A number of tribes are mentioned as 
founders. One of them, the Meria, was decidedly primarily Finno-Ugric-speaking, as distinct 
from Slavic-speaking. The problem remains: If the people written about in these early sources 
identified with their tribe, and the polity to which some of them belonged consisted of Slavs 
and other ethnoi, then what exactly was the status of ‘Slavs’ for these people? The fact of the 
constitutive outside also remains: the narratives a group comes to tell about themselves – that 
is, their identity narrative –must be accepted by the rest of the world to be stabilised 
(Campbell 1992). This process of stabilising us-them relations is invariably tied up with 
questions of security. James C. Scott (2009) made a point similar to Curta’s in the context of 
South-East Asia, when he insisted that ‘tribes’ are created by states that seek to order the 
world in its image. In Scott’s reading, before states, there are simply groups; only when states 
begin to name what they see as a less developed and less ordered constitutive outside in order 
to secure its own Self, are ‘tribes’ born.17  
 
It is also quite striking that, a century and a half after the advent of the nation in Europe, 
British anthropologists who worked in Africa and elsewhere still tried to order the social 
space they studied in terms of ethnoi, understood as something that pertained to others only, 
and not in terms of nations.
18
 To the political eye, one obvious reason for this is to do with 
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security. Let us follow Gellner and think of nationalism as the political doctrine that the 
nation and the state should coincide. Nationalism, then, is a specific answer to the question of 
we-ness that all polities have to deal with: ‘we’ are the nation, the territory of the polity is a 
national territory, the administration of the polity is staffed with nationals. Nationalism is 
inherently internationalist, in the sense that it comes complete with a recipe for world order: 
the world should be ordered in nations. Since there is no such thing as a culturally 
homogeneous territory of any size, a national world order cannot be stable, for there will 
always be matter out of place: minorities, nomads, expats, foreign spouses, tourists, liminal 
elements. Nationalism secures a certain homogenized Self by playing up one kind of 
difference, ethnicity, as crucial, and thereby takes a lot of wind out of the sails of other kinds 
of similarity and difference that could serve to dampen the effects of that particular kind of 
difference. Ethnicity becomes a shibboleth, that is, a shorthand for group belonging 
altogether.
19
 However, this homogenizing securing of a nation comes at the price of potential 
instability internally, since all groups can hardly be altogether eliminated. Groups constituted 
by ethnic difference – ethnic minorities -- remain a potential source of instability. 
Furthermore, other kinds of difference that have to do with class, age, sexual orientation, level 
of education etc. will remain as potential sources of instability.  
 
Where there is instability, there is concern about security. If instability is structurally caused 
by a principle, and if instability gives rise to security concerns, then that principle and security 
are inextricably linked. It follows that a nationalist world order is one where security is 
always in question, at least potentially. Since the mid-1990s, security studies have evolved a 
comprehensive approach to explaining how such potential sources of insecurity as nationalism 
become actualized. It happens by dint of a speech act, whereby a person or an institution in 
authority pronounces a phenomenon to be not only a political challenge, but also a threat to 
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the self’s very ability to go on as before. The process whereby something is made into an 
existential or ontic threat to a polity’s security is called securitization.20  
 
The concept of securitization may also help us understand how ethnicity also becomes a 
potential political resource, for if ethnos may be turned into nation, then the argument for self-
determination is already made. The 19
th
- and early 20
th
-century imperial answer to this 
problem was to insist on the historicity of nations (Wolff 1982 [2010]). For an ethnos to be a 
nation, nineteenth-century Europeans argued, it needed some predecessor in the ancient 
world. So, say, the ethnoi in Zambia could not be nations, for then they would be half way on 
their way to statehood, and that would be a challenge to the British empire in Zambia. Again, 
we are seeing a replay of Greek and Roman mistakes. Greeks and Romans too thought other 
peoples had no history, and the reason was that they thought – mistakenly – that membership 
in these peoples was determined by birth (Geary 2002: 50). So, a group may ‘have’ ethnicity, 
or it may have history, but it cannot have both. As far as I am aware, this logic first returns to 
the modern world in the 1820s, in North America, when the Haudenosaunee or Iroquois quite 
smartly insisted on nationhood. This was denied them by American colonists, on the ground 
that they allegedly lacked historical depth – quite wrongly, as it has turned out, for the 
Iroquois league seems to have been around at least since the 14
th
 century. If, however, the 
Iroquois had been acknowledged as a nation, then the manifest destiny of the American state 
would have been put into question, and that would have constituted an ontic threat. Security 
concerns were crucial, then, to the denial of nationhood to groups within European and 
Amerrican 19
th
 and 20
th
 century states and empires. 
 
There is a wider issue here, for the anchoring of nations in the past was a matter of ontic 
security not only for aspiring nations, but for all nations and all nation states. It is a by now 
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much-belaboured point that European historians have been key nation builders, so let me 
rather focus on security and the role of archaeology, which was another kind of knowledge 
that came in handy in this regard. 
 
Like geography, archaeology was born of security needs, but it was only born some two 
centuries ago. It is no coincidence that its emergence dovetails nicely with the emergence of 
nationalism as a political doctrine, for the major inspiration, German romantic thinking, was 
the same. The place was Denmark and the time was the Napoleonic Wars. The Danish King 
had the bad luck of having allied with Napoleon, and things were looking grim. With 
inspiration from German Romanticism, which was already well established at Copenhagen 
University, one of the ways to boost morale was to begin inquiring into old stuff. More 
specifically, the King charged a professor by the name of Christian Thomsen with putting a 
lot of old artefacts on display, so as to demonstrate the antiquity and, by romantic lights, 
greatness of the Danish nation. Thomsen had to order the stuff that had been dug up 
somehow. He did this by focussing on what the different artefacts were made of. Thomsen 
then went on to postulate that stuff made of stone had to be older than stuff made of bronze, 
which would in turn be older than iron artefacts. The idea of a pre-history, a three-phased 
prehistory, was born (Renfrew 2007). 
 
There was one problem. How do you get from a pre-history of artefacts to a history of 
peoples? The problem persists to this day (Curta 2011). Archaeologists define culture 
materially, as ‘a recurring set of artefact types that co-occur in a particular region during a set 
time-period’ (Anthony 2007: 130).21 Anthropologists, in the degree that they still use the 
concept at all (Kuper 2000), define culture as practices, as social facts, or as both – that is, as 
social stuff.  So, if the goal is to produce knowledge that may anchor a socially defined entity, 
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namely the nation, in a materially defined past, what is the glue between the social and the 
material? 
 
The answer to that neatly presented itself at about the same time as Thomsen invented pre-
history, in 1786, when Sir William Jones observed the similarity between Sanskrit, Greek and 
Roman.
22
 As the study of Indo-European languages got under way, it became possible to re-
spool the emergence of languages by comparing the phonetics and the meanings of words 
stemming from the same root in the oldest known written Indo-European languages. By 
comparing phonetics and adding knowledge about how phonetics change historically, and by 
identifying their overlapping meaning, it became possible to postulate Proto-Indo-European 
words like *wódr for water and *devi for god, although Proto-Indo-European was of course a 
dead and always oral language that could never be observed directly (Mallory and Adams 
2006). It was quite clear that Indo-Europeans in-migrated from the east – where else should 
they come from? – so it was possible to align material findings and linguistic evolution along 
an east-west gradient. Given romanticism’s stress on language as a cultural marker, the 
following syllogism lay close at hand: 
 
-every ethnos is defined by its language 
-Slavic was a language 
-Ergo Slavs were an ethnos. 
 
By the lights of the adage that every nation has to have a predecessor in the ancient world, it 
follows that present-day Slav nations hail from a common ancient ethnos. In the light of the 
above discussion, the error in this argument is easily spotted: it does not follow from the fact 
that people spoke similar languages that they also constituted an ethnos. Polity formation in 
23 
 
the Eurasian steppe simply did not work like that. Nothing has only one origin. It follows that 
we can re-spool languages
23
, but we cannot re-spool social stuff in the same way. While not 
impossible, the entire attempt at anchoring the nations of today in the material cultures of 
yesterday is therefore a highly dangerous one (Curta 2011). 
 
It is also a matter that is easily securitized. We need look no further than the quarrels between 
Bulgarians and Croats, Croats and Serbs, Russians and Ukrainians, Ukrainians and Poles 
about which material findings should be ascribed to whom, or to Stalin’s use of a common 
Slavic origin to argue for Yugoslav or South Slav subordination in the 1940s, to see examples 
of this phenomenon and its effects. These are questions of what kind of future, secured by 
what kind of past, the polity (ideally the nation state) in question will have. 
  
To stay with Slavic examples, present-day Russian nationalism also blatantly demonstrates 
another interstice between security and nationalism that springs from how the nation is 
conceived in time. This has to do with the root metaphor of the sleeping nation. Early nation 
builders were faced with a problem. If each nation had an anchoring predecessor in the 
ancient world, then what had happened to this nation? Why was it not in sight? The answer 
was that it was sleeping, and that it was the responsibility, even the sacred task, of nation 
builders to awaken it. The nation, then, was anchored in the past, but it was at the same time 
young and rested – invigorated by sleep, as it were -- and destined to take over the future. 
This logic has an implicit security logic to it as well, for, in the realm of organic metaphors 
like this one, what needs to be born and grow needs to do so at the cost of what needs to 
wither and die. The birth and growth of a nation demands the withering and death of 
something else. 
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In the case of Russian nationalism, it is quite clear what is young and vital, and what is old 
and tired. Some twenty years ago, I wrote my first doctorate on how Russian nationalism from 
its very inception, from the days of Vladimir Odoyevsky (1803-1869), treated Europe as its 
main Other and as old and tired. This argument was taken a step further a hundred years ago, 
when Stepan Shevyrev declared that Europe was already rotten, with a stench of death about 
it. The representation of Europe as rich but rotten and Russia as poor but vital; Europe as 
democratically led and weak, Russia as led by a strongman and, well, strong; Europe as being 
faithless, Russia as being the true believer etc. is now back. There are some new twists 
regarding exactly what the rot consists of, with matters sexual and reproductive coming to the 
fore. Europe’s decadence and rottenness is now said to be evident from a penchant for 
multiculturalism, but also from the tolerance of homosexuality, pedophilia and incest. This is 
a major theme of the Russian Orthodox Church, and Orthodoxy is now routinely evoked as a 
key diacriticon for Russian nationalism and a key component of Russian assabiya, as when 
President Vladimir Putin declared already in 2007 how 
 
Orthodoxy and the nuclear sector strengthen Russian statehood and security. These 
themes are closely interconnected, because the Russian Federation’s traditional 
confession and Russia’s nuclear shield are the elements that strengthen Russian 
statehood, create the necessary preconditions for safeguarding the country’s internal 
and external security (quoted in Østbø 2016: 212).  
 
The idea that Europe and the west are qualitatively different from Russia and something 
threatening is not only back. It is officially back. It has become part of official Russian 
nationalism. In 2014, a working group led by the head of the President’s administration, 
Sergey Ivanov, presented a document called Bases for the State’s Cultural Politics.24 The 
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document was embraced by President Putin, and used repeatedly by Minister of Culture 
Vladimir Medinski. According to this document, Russia is a unique civilization, between east 
and west (the document also stated that ‘Russia is not Europe’, but this statement was 
removed after numerous protests from artists and intellectuals; Neumann 2017). The 
document details a number of ways to enhance patriotic pride, such as strengthening school 
curricula regarding Russian history, staging museum exhibitions, etc. Since the publication of 
the document, there has indeed been a marked upturn in the debate about nationalist agitation 
in schools, preferably already from the first grade onwards. Museums have beefed up on 
patriotism. A recent exhibition in the Manège just off Red Square concerned Ivan Grozni 
(variously translated as Ivan the Terrible, Ivan the Threatening), who was depicted as a vital 
and strong leader that was forever under attack from devious Europe.
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 What is at issue here is 
not only securitization of past sequences, but also legitimation of the future. Europe and the 
west have ‘always’ tried to keep the Russian nation from reaching its full potential, and they 
are still at it. The only way to defend Russia is to fight back, and history is a weapon with 
which to reach the future that rightly belongs to a young and vital nation with an old and 
hallowed past such as Russia. The security implications of this kind of cosmology should be 
immediately obvious. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Security is about upholding group identity, in the sense that it concerns when and how to 
represent what is happening in the world as a threat to the Self’s ability to go on, and what to 
do to forestall such threats. In a world of scarce resources, security is an imperative for any 
polity. My focus on security in the emergence of ethnicity and nationalism has highlighted 
three aspects worthy of further study. The first concerns how ethnicity is an imposed 
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category. The second concerns how nationhood was attempted denied to others, and the third 
aspect is to do with how nationalism’s ever-present organic metaphors in and of themselves 
spell security concerns. 
 
The emergence of ethnicity was first and foremost driven by security concerns: it was 
imposed on the Other as a way of ordering what was outside the Self, to make it more 
manageable and less threatening. One way of thinking about the Other’s identity, what we 
now call ethnicity, emerged amongst the Greeks and Romans and resulted in the interpellation 
of ever new groups into a self-understanding as an ethnos. This kind of knowledge production 
is not only seeped in asymmetrical power – the interpellating party makes an entire polity do 
something it otherwise would not have done, namely evolve into an ethnos  – it is also often 
explicitly securitizing. As demonstrated above, that was certainly the case where Slav-
Byzantine relations in the early Middle Ages were concerned.  
 
If ethnicity is an identity for the Other, then nationalism is an identity for the Self. It becomes 
a security concern not to order the Other polity’s identity, as did the Byzantines, but to see to 
it that groups that may threaten the Self’s own nationalism – minorities, imperial subjects – 
cannot embrace nationalism. The basic reason for this is obvious, for if ethnic groups were 
given the status of nation, then by the logic of nationalism, that would bring these polities on a 
par with their imperial masters. The policy followed by all 19
th
-century European empires and 
their settler colonies of denying nationhood to, say, the Iroquois in North America or 
allegedly ahistorical groups in Africa and Eastern Europe by denying that they had a history 
and so did not qualify as nations, must be understood among other things as security policy.  
 
27 
 
The organic understanding of the nation as young and vital demonstrates a third interstice 
between security and nationalism. If the young and vital nation is to grow and expand at the 
expense of the old and tired ones, and if it is warranted in doing so by nature itself, then the 
polity that represents itself as a young and vital nation is by dint of that very representation a 
security threat against those that they represent as old and tired. One contemporary example 
of how this works may be seen in contemporary Russia, where it is becoming state policy that 
Russia is a vital force with a claim to a future, whereas liberal Europe is an old and dying 
wreck. The act of denying a future to another polity is a securitizing move, for security is, by 
definition, about warding off what is seen as threats against a polity’s ability to go on as 
before. Nationalism was imbricated with security concerns from the very beginning, and 
remains so imbricated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 I should like to thank Maren Garberg Bredesen, John Breuilly, Thomas Hylland Eriksen, my 
referees and the audience at the plenary session of the ASEN Conference, LSE, 22 April 2015, for 
comments on previous drafts. 
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2 Note that I limit myself to collective security threats; individual security is a rather different 
phenomenon that will not be addressed here. 
3 A similar move was made by neo-realists like Barry Posen and Steve van Evera in the early 
1990s, who simply kept their structural framework, but substituted nations for states as units of 
analysis. As did Huntington’s, this move effectively bracketed the issues discussed here. 
4 Note that the elite kinship line that delivered rulers – what the Mongols called Golden Kin – 
certainly was integrative on that level. Kinship is important to all polities (Haugevik and Neumann 
2017). The point here is that kinship was not in play as an integrative force for the polity as a 
whole – the glue here was follow-the-leader, not kinship.   
5 He also stresses the importance of raw material – or what Smith called a mythomoteur, for the 
formation of ethnicity; ‘Ethnicity is constituted at the intersection of habitual dispositions of the agents 
concerned and the social conditions existing in a particular historical context’; (Curta 2001: 21).  
6 Here is Curta’s (2001: 37-8) introduction to the key work: ‘Procopius’ view of the Slavs is a 
function of his general concept of oikumene. An analysis of his diplomatic terminology reveals his 
idea of an empire surrounded by ‘allies’ (enopondoi), such as the Saracens, the Lombards, the 
Gepids, the Goths, the Cutrigars [a Hunnic tribe], and the Antes. The Sclavenes do not belong to 
this group, most probably because Procopius viewed them as ‘new’. Indeed, among all forty-one 
references to Sclavenes or Antes in Procopius’ work […] all verbs used in reference to settlements 
[…] appear in the present tense or in the medium voice. Procopius constantly referred to Sclavenes 
in relation to Antes and Huns or to other nomads. When talking about Slavic dwellings, he 
employed kalibai, a phrase he only used for military tents and for Moorish compounds. Both this 
phrase and the claim that the Slavs set up their dwellings far from one another betray the influence 
of military technology.’ 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                        
7 Pohl’s (2003: 583, 587) reading of the social sequence grounding this etymological development 
is illuminating: ‘Obviously, the key to Slavicization is not Slavic power. Slavs did not spread by 
expanding their dominion but under the direct or indirect rule of Avars, Bulgars and other lords. I 
have therefore tried to explain the expansion of early Slavs by the attraction of a social and cultural 
model that implied a lower level of social differentiation and surplus production than both the 
Byzantine Empire and the barbarian kingdoms. Sixth- and seventh-century Byzantine sources indicate 
that Slavs, unlike all others, did not enslave their prisoners of war but allowed them to settle freely 
among them. There is some incidental evidence that the inhabitants of Slavic villages north of the 
lower Danube were of quite mixed origin. This way of life may have appealed to the rural 
population in a wide area. Their produce had previously gone to the Byzantine state, the Church 
and/or barbarian warlords, whose abilities to offer protection in return had seriously declined. 
Linguistic Slavicization may have only come later. […] Whoever migrated from the Avar empire 
came to be called a Slav if he settled in a rural community in the Slavic manner, for instance in 
the Peloponnes or in Dalmatia’. 
8 It is warranted to talk about degrees here, for amongst ancient Greeks, who were still known and 
studied by the Byzantines a millennium later, there was also a tradition of embarking on blue skies 
travelling in order to seek out new peoples; such an expedition was known a theoria –- a voyage 
of discovery: ’ the term theoria did not only mean philosophical contemplation, methodical scheme, 
or rational statement of principles (as we generally understand the notion of theory today) but that 
it also 
had a twofold diplomatic sense. First, theoria was a name for the solemn or sacred embassy sent 
to consult the oracle (like the embassy to Delphi or Delos). […] Second, theoria was a freelance 
or ecumenical embassy of prominent citizens of the polis, “sent abroad to see the world” with the 
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purpose of finding out the laws and political ways of other peoples (non-Greeks) and bringing 
back this knowledge to inform and suggest reforms in the polis’ (Constantinou 2006: 352-3). 
9 ‘Big-men are leaders who organize feasts and festivals, daring warriors and commanders in 
warfare, aggressors in interpersonal and intergroup conflict. Orators, directors of communal work and 
enterprise, men of authority who arbitrate disputes within the community, ritual practitioners, magicians 
and sorcerers. Some dominate by their physical strength, particularly in contexts where leading 
warriors are politically important, some by force of character. […] Maurice Godelier [1986: 105-10] 
took as a starting point that the big-man system is derived from the great-man system. To 
Godelier, a big-man belongs within a peculiar institutional system, in which the principle of 
competitive exchange takes precedence over the principle of war. By contrast, the great-man 
advances alone toward the enemy lines, followed by a handful of assistants, and engages in single 
combat with any warrior prepared to match his skill and strength. He gains prestige, a name for 
himself, and admiration, but not wealth. In times of war, his authority is unquestioned; in peacetime 
his function disappears, but his prestige remains’ (Curta 2001: 328-9). In other words, the great-
man is a champion. For contemporary use of the bigman category, se Utas (2012). 
10 We have documented examples of how great-men tried to set themselves up as chiefs amongst 
neighbouring Germanic peoples, with one successful example being Maroboduus of the Germanic 
Marcomanni (Todd 1992: 29-31).  
11 There is another possibility that Curta (2001: 349) is very open to, namely that early writers 
did not record names of leaders because these groups were not important enough for them to do 
so. The whole thrust of his argument points to the unlikelihood of these leaders having been strong 
enough to deserve the title of chief, though.    
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12 ‘Big-men and chiefs became prominent especially in contexts in which they embodied collective 
interest and responsibility. Chiefs like Dauritas and Samo “created” groups by speaking and taking 
action in the name of their respective communities’ (Curta 2001: 343). 
13 Note also that the Byzantine interpellation of groups into ethnoi had the unwanted consequence of 
strengthening Slavic assabiya. By being the opposite of divide and rule, it called forth a security 
threat. Once realised, Byzantines tried to counteract this effect by belatedly trying to block the 
formation of Slav polities, as did the Slav’s Avar overlords. Still, ‘[i]n the course of the seventh 
century, the decline of Avar rule made the formation of regional Slavic powers on the western 
periphery of the Avar empire possible’ (Pohl 2003: 584). 
14 Of course, fibulae, like all things, cannot index ethnicity all by themselves; they are simply raw 
material for the creation of social facts. As Wickham (1981: 68) puts it, ‘a man or woman with a 
Lombard-style brooch is no more necessarily a Lombard than a family in Bradford with a Toyota is 
Japanese; artefacts are no secure guide to ethnicity’).  
15 The theme of how leading kinship lines of the contemporary Germanic neighbours of the Slav 
maintained their pre-eminence by invoking a great ancestral past, complete with religiously sanctioned 
successes, is a major theme in the literature about early Germanics.  
16 To be clear, and apropos of current debates about performativity, I would not argue that the Slav 
ethnos was created ex nihilo, as would, say, Cynthia Weber (Weber 1998: 78; for a critique, see 
Ringmar 2016), who holds that 'all subjects in process (be they individual or collective) are the 
ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted’. Slavs did not come into existence 
by an act of performativity only; there was raw material there. 
17 This book and this point builds on and generalizes his earlier book Seeing Like a State (1998), 
where he set out how high modernity regimes insist on ordering geographical and social space in 
their image.  
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18 When British anthropologists worked in the Zambian copper belt in the 1930s, they drew up lists 
of ethnic groups in the area. The list was long, but 'whites' was not on it. To colonial British 
anthropologists, as to Greeks and Romans before them, ethnicity was something others had. But, as 
we have just seen, the problem is that they did not. The emic (self-describing) categories of the 
people studied remained stubbornly different from the etic (analytical, imposed from outside) models 
introduced first by the Byzantine and then by the British empire. While early British anthropologists 
tended to come from non-exalted backgrounds, some of them were steeped in classical writers like 
Tacitus, and many British colonial administrators certainly were. The degree in which British 
classifications were directly influenced by British classicist educational practices should be researched 
further. 
19 See Hebrew bible, book seven, chapter 12. 
20 The locus classicus is Wæver 1995. The literature on securitization is vast and growing. 
According to the serving editor of the flagship journal of the International Studies Association, 
International Studies Quarterly, a clear majority of manuscripts on security submitted to that journal is 
on securitization (personal communication from Daniel H. Nexon, 24 April 2016).  
21 When finds are of one type only, say when one finds pottery with a certain decorative pattern in 
a large area but other artefacts are not similar, archaeologists talk about a horizon, i.e. an area 
that is interlinked but not necessarily culturally similar, Anthony (2007: 131) defines a horizon as 
‘a single artefact type or cluster of artefact types that spreads suddenly over a very wide 
geographical area’. 
22 A relationship had been suggested before, but it was with Jones that the question became a 
problem for science to solve. 
23 Note that a pristine Proto-Indo-European language never existed; for example, the word for bull, 
*tauros, seems to have been a Semitic loan word. 
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24 The document is available as 
http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d526a877638a8730eb.pdf. For a highly critical rejoinder 
from 27 members of the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences, see 
http://iph.ras.ru/cult_polit.htm. The first public airing of the document took place in Izvestiya, 10 
April 2014; http://izvestia.ru/news/569016. All documents retrieved 9 April 2015. 
25 See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/world/europe/russian-museum-seeks-a-warmer-
adjective-for-ivan-the-terrible.html?emc=edit_th_20150331&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=33162912&_r=2; 
retrieved 9 April 2015. 
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